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See ing Thr ough  a G las s, Da rk ly: The S ocial
Context  of “Par t icu la r  Socia l  Groups” in  
Lwin v. IN S
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 The world and its court s ar e in t ur moil. Crim e, civil and
politica l viole nce, p er se cut ion , a nd w ar  a ffect  un told  mill ion s,
as “‘socia l su ffer in g’ [has b ecom e] a  ha llm ark of our  ‘chaot ic a nd
crue l cen tu ry. ’”1 As  those fleein g h ards h ip  wit h in  their  coun-
t r ie s seek  refuge in t he sa fe and r elatively affluent U nited
States, feder al a dm inis tr at ive an d a ppella te cour ts  st ru ggle t o
apply the Re fugee  Act of 1980 (Re fugee  Act). 2 Passed a lm ost
twen ty years  ago, the Refugee Act pr ovides a s afe  h aven  for
“refugees”—those wh o ar e un ab le or u nw illing t o ret ur n t o their
coun t ry “b eca use  of pe r se cut ion  or  a  we ll-fou nde d fe a r  of
per secut ion on  account  of race, r eligion, n a tion alit y,
membership in  a  pa r t icu la r  socia l group, or  politica l opinion .”3
Th e Refugee Act a lso allows refugees wh o have eith er en ter ed
or  s t ayed in th e Unit ed Sta tes illegally to rema in in t he Un ited
Stat es.4 Con gres s pa ssed  th e Refugee Act d eclar ing “th at  it is
th e his tor ic policy of t he  Un i ted S ta t es to respond  to the  u rgen t
ne eds  of pers ons s ub ject t o per secu tion  in t he ir h omela nd .”5
Fear of pers ecut ion pr ovoked by “m e mbersh ip  in  a
pa r ticu lar  social group” is a uniqu e basis for gran ting r efugee
s ta tus to t hose s eekin g as ylum . Alth ou g h  for  t he  pas t  for ty
years  this criterion has been included in in terna t iona l  r efugee
law, court s still str uggle to find a work able an d consist ent wa y
to de fin e a  “pa r t icu la r  socia l gr oup.” Ther e is  lit t le i n ter na t ion a l
and domestic legislative his t or y  on  the  mean ing of “par t icu la r
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6. 144 F. 3d  505  (7t h C ir . 19 98).
7. S ee T. David  Pa rish , Note , Membership  in  a  Part icular  Social Group Under
the Refugee Act of 1980: Social Identity and  th e Leg al C oncep t of t he R efu gee, 92
CO L U M. L. RE V. 923, 944 (1992) (“No U.S. court h as yet  defined c lea r -cu t  and
adequa te criteria for determ ining social group sta tus. The B IA [Boar d of Im mi gr at ion
App ea ls],  rat her t han  developing a tr ue definition, has confined itself to delinea tin g
an  outer limit. While Sa nchez-Trujillo proffers a  solut ion to t he difficult pr oblem  of
de fin ing th e social grou p cate gory, it h as n ot been  adopt ed out side t he N in t h  Ci rcu i t .
Even  with in t he N int h Cir cuit, Sa nchez-Trujillo’s au th orit y is problematic. Other
circuits  ha ve e it he r r em ai ne d s ilen t on  th is i ss ue  or r ea che d con clus ions a s  t o t he
cognizability  of pa rt icu la r p ur por te d s ocia l gr oup s wi th out  re vea lin g t he  cri t eri a u pon
wh ich  th es e con clu sio ns  ar e ba se d.” (foot no te  om it te d)).
socia l group,” a nd court s h ave be en forced t o inte rp ret  its
mean ing withou t  a  s ign ifi can t  amount  of mean ingfu l  gu idance .
Because  defin ing s ocial grou ps is  ess en tia l to r efugee  law , an d
because  the in ter pr et a t ion  of the d efin it ion  of “pa r t icu l a r socia l
group” has s ign ifica n t  im pa ct  on  pe ople in side  and ou t side  of
the Un it ed  St a tes , a  wor kable  de fin it ion  must be  developed,
a l lowing cour t s  t o app ly r efu gee  la w con si st en t ly a nd in  accord
with  st at ed congr ession al a nd  int ern at iona l hu ma nit ar ian
policies.
Lw in v. INS 6 is a r ecent e xamp le of the S event h Cir cuit ’s
att empt  to sor t  t h rough th e various definit ions developed
throughout  the other circuits.7 The  defin ition  ap plied  by th e
Seven th Circu it in  Lwin , which  defines  “pa rt icular  social
groups” by th eir  “imm ut ab le cha ra cter ist ics,” alth ough
fundamenta l ly soun d, is in complet e. The  ter m “imm ut able ” is
mislead ing in  tha t  i t  includes  not  on ly characteristics that
cannot be chan ged, but also characte r is t ics  tha t  a  person  should
not have to cha nge. Th us , th e most  difficult  cases to decide ar e
those in wh ich a p ers on seek s a sylu m ba sed on  volunt a r y
act ion s or  conduct  tha t  the  pe rson  can  change but  feels he or
she should n ot ha ve t o cha nge. If court s ar e to decide wheth er
those changeable cha ract er i stics ar e “imm ut able,” an d th ereby
define a valid pa rt icular social group, th ey mus t consider t he
sign ifica nce of a person’s conduct  in  the economic,  socia l,  and
politica l conte xt of th e per son’s own coun tr y.
Pa r t  II of th i s n ot e pr ovides t he  his tor ical a nd  legisla tive
back groun d of moder n r efugee la w and in t roduces  Lwin  v. INS .
Pa r t  III ident ifies th e hu ma nita rian  pur poses of refugee law
and concludes tha t  t he  t es t  applied  in Lw in  a ccu ra t e ly  re fl ect s
those pu rpos es  bu t  u lt im ately  fa ils  to provide a means of
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8. Con ven tion  Relat ing t o th e St at us of Refu gees, opened for signature  Ju ly 28,
1951, 19 U .S. T. 6 260 , 18 9 U .N .T. S. 1 37 [h er ein aft er  Con ven ti on ].
9. Maryellen  Fu llert on, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status B a s ed  on
Pers ecut ion  Due to Membership in  a Particular S ocial Group , 26 CORNELL  IN T’L L.J .
505, 508  (199 3).
10. Conven t ion , supra  note 8, 189 U.N.T.S. at  152.
11. 1 AT L E  GR AH L-MA D SE N , TH E  ST AT U S  OF  RE F U G E E S I N  INTERNATIONAL LAW  219
(196 6).
12. Fa tin  v. I NS , 12  F. 3d  123 3, 1 239  (3d C ir . 19 93) (q uo ta ti on  om it te d).
ach iev ing them. This note concludes that in order  to
m e a ningfully  an d consist ent ly app ly refu gee law , cour ts  sh ould
make factu al in quir ies t o dete rm ine t he s ocial sign ifica nce of
th e per son’s action s a s pe rceived  in t he ir own  count ry.
II. BA CK G R OU N D
A. International History of Refugee Law
 In  1951, t he U nit ed N at ions  convened  a  con fe r en ce of
plenipoten tiar ies in Geneva with the pur pose of making laws to
protect  refu gee s.  Th e r es u lt  of th is  confer en ce w a s  t h e 1951
Gen eva  Convention Relating to Statu s of Refugees.8 Th is  was
the “fi r st  i nt e rna tiona l compa ct  to adopt a  un iversal r efugee
defin it ion , r a the r  than one t ied  to a  pa r t icu la r  na t ion al or
et hn ic group .”9 Un der  th is defin ition, a  “refu gee” is
a n y  pe r son  w h o
. . . .
. . . ow in g t o we ll-fou n de d fe a r  of bei n g p er se cut ed  for
r e a son s  of ra ce, r elig ion , n at ion a lit y, m em be r sh ip  of a
p a r t icu l a r socia l g r ou p  or  p olit ica l op in ion , is  ou t s id e  th e
co u n t r y of  his  nat ional i ty  a nd  is  un able  or ,  owing t o s u ch  fe a r ,
is  u n willin g t o a va il h im self of t he p rotect ion of  th at  count ry;
o r  w h o,  n ot  h a v i n g a  n a t i on a l it y a n d  be in g o u t s id e  t h e  co u n t r y
of h i s for m e r  h a b it u a l re side nce  . . . is u n a b le  or , ow in g  to s u ch
fe a r ,  i s u n w i ll in g  t o r e t u r n  t o  it .10
The phrase “particular social group” was added as an
“a ft e r though t .”11 It wa s proposed by th e Swed ish  re pr esen ta tive
who expla ined  only th at  it was  needed becau se “experience ha d
shown th at  certa in refugees h ad been  persecut ed because t hey
belonged to pa rt icula r s ocial grou ps.”12 Na t ions th at  ra tified the
conven t ion  agreed  to abide by th e definition of “refugee”
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13. S ee F u l le r ton, supra  note 9, at 510 n.26. Signatory sta tes ar e not requir ed
to adm it r efugees, bu t t hey a re r equir ed to gr an t t hem  specific right s. Artic le 33 of
t h e Convention pr ohibits states  from retur ning refugees to ter ritories wher e they
would  face  th re at s t o th eir  life or  fre edo m d ue  to r ace , r elig ion , n at ion al it y, po lit ica l
opin ion  or m emb ers hip in  a socia l grou p. S ee Conven tion , supra  note 8, at  176.
Article  32 pre vent s st at es from e xpelling r efugees a bsen t a  showin g of  na t i ona l
secur ity.  Id  at  175. Article  31 prohibits states from penalizing aliens who entered th e
s t a t e i ll ega l ly  as  long as they came d ir ect ly fr om a  st at e wh er e t he ir  lives  or fr eed om
are in jeopa rdy. Id  at 175.
14. Pr otocol  Rela t i n g to the S tat us of Refugees, Jan . 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268.
15. S ee Fatin , 12 F .3d a t 1 239; see als o INS  v. Cardoza-Fonse ca, 480 U.S. 421,
436 (1987) (“If one thing is clea r fr om  th e le gisl at ive h ist ory  of th e n ew d efin iti on of
‘refu gee,’ and indeed the en tire 1980 Act, it is tha t one of Congress’ primary pur poses
was to br ing U nit ed St at es r efugee  law in to conform an ce with  th e [Pr otocol] . . . .”);
H.R.  CO N F . RE P . NO . 96-781, at  19 (1980), reprinted in  1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 160;
S. RE P . NO . 96-256, at  4, 14–15 (1979 ), reprinted in  1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144,
154–55 (incorpora tin g th e obligation s an d definit ions of the P rotocol into United
Stat es la w).
16. S ee Car doz a-Fon seca , 480 U.S. at 433.
17. S ee Bolan os-Her na nde z v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1281–83 (9th Cir. 1984). By
mak ing with hold ing of deport at ion a n on-discret ionar y rem edy, Congr ess fina lly
complied with th e Convention’s Article 33.1 nonrefoulment r equiremen t th at  “[n]o
esta blished by th e conven tion , bu t  t hey were not required to
admit th ose who acquired refugee status. 13
B. Refugee Law in the United States
1. Th e Refugee Act of 1980
 The U n it e d  S t a t es  d id  n ot  sign  the 1951 Conven t ion , bu t
acced ed t o t he 1967 U nit ed  Na t ion s P rotocol Re la t in g t o the
S t a t u s of Refugees.14 In  orde r  to comply wi th  the P rotocol,
Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 and codified the
Pr otocol’s defin it ion  of “refugee,” which included, among others,
those who wer e per secut ed a s m emb ers  of part icular  social
groups.15
Befor e 1980 t her e wa s n o sta tu tor y bas is for gra nt ing
re fugee  s ta tus to peop le  who ap plied for a sylu m fr om wit hin  th e
Unit ed States. 16 The  Refugee Act cha nged  th is by a llowing
people alrea dy in th e Unit ed Sta tes t o receive re fugee sta tus
and be gra nt ed a sylu m  u n der  8 U.S .C. § 1158, or t o receive
with holdin g of depor t a t ion und er 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h). While the
Attorn ey Gen er al h as  discr et ion t o gra nt  or de ny a sylu m, t he
Attorn ey Gen era l is obligat ed t o gran t wit h hold in g of
depor t a t ion  to t hose  wh o qua lify.17 The  Att orn ey Gen era l’s
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Cont ract ing Sta te sh all  expel or ret urn  (‘refouler’) a refugee in any ma nner
what soever t o  the  fron t ie r s of terr itories wher e his life or freedom would be
thr eaten ed on account  of his . . . membership of [sic] a pa rt icular  social gr oup.”
Conven t ion , supra  note 8, 189 U.N.T.S. at  176.
18. S ee 8 C. F. R. § 2 .1 (1 998 ).
19. See i d . §§ 3.1–.8.
20. S ee sources cited supra  note 15.
21. Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F .2d 1, 3 (1st Cir . 19 90) (quotin g Cardoza-
Fon seca , 480  U. S. a t 4 48).
22. Fa t in  v. INS , 12 F .3d 1 233,  1239  (3d Ci r. 1 993); see also Chev ron  U.S.A.,
Inc. v. N at ur al  Res ou rce s D efe ns e Co un cil, I nc. , 46 7 U .S.  837 , 84 2–4 5 (19 84).
23. 8 U. S.C . § 11 05(a )(4) (19 94).
immigrat ion  du t ies a re d ele ga ted  to the Immigr a t ion  and
Na tu ra li za t ion  Service (INS)18 and  to th e Boar d of Imm igra tion
Appea l s (BIA).19 Peop le see kin g re fugee  stat us can appea l BIA
decis ion s to t he  feder al cir cuit  court s a nd , ult ima te ly, t o t he
U.S . Supreme Cour t .
2. Congressional legislative history
 Congress has provided little m ean ingful guidan ce to cour t s
tha t  mu st in ter pret t he t erm  “pa rt icular  social grou p,” mere ly
s t a t ing that  its purpose in passing the Refugee Act was to
comply with int erna tional refugee law.20 Becau se of th e lack  of
legisla tive  guidan ce, a  cour t  defin ing  the t e rm “par t icu la r  socia l
group” mus t  employ  regu la r  ru les of s t a tu tory  in te rpre ta t ion .
Cour t s have been  “cau t ioned  tha t  wh en  Con gr es s,  im pl icit ly or
explicit ly, leaves gaps in a statu tory program, ‘the court s must
resp ect th e int er pr et at ion of th e a gen cy to wh ich Congr ess  has
delegated  t h e  r espon sibilit y for ad min ist er ing t he  . . .
p rog ram.’”21 The Third Circuit furt her explained tha t “the
Boa rd of Immigrat ion Appea ls ’ in ter pr et a t ion  of a  pr ovis ion  of
the Refugee Act is entitled to defer en ce.”22 A cour t  “mus t  uphold
the Boar d’s conclusion  ‘if it is su ppor t ed by reas onable,
subs tan t ia l , and pr obat ive evidence on t he r ecord considered  as
a  wh ole.’”23 The re fore, in  light  of th e sca nt  legisla tive  his tor y,
cour t s should give substan tial deferen ce to BIA decisions wh en
applying refugee law.
3. J udicial  in terpr eta ti ons of  th e R efu gee Act
 To deter mine wh o can be cla ssifi ed  a s a  m e m be r  of a
p a r t icu la r social group u nder  th e Refugee Act (which is near ly
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24. Pa r i sh , supra  note 7,  a t  931 (footnotes omitted). The author concludes that
“a  valid defin it ion of the s ocial  gr oup  cat egor y m us t e xclu de fr om r efu gee  st at us  th ose
deemed  displa ced per sons  un der  U.S . law, r ecognizing only those t ruly r ejected by
th eir  sta tes  of origin.” Id . at 932.
25. 19 I. &  N.  Dec. 21 1 (19 85).
26. Id . a t 212. The BI A re lie d on  th e d oct ri ne  of ejusdem generis ,  wh ich  means
tha t  gen er al  wor ds  us ed i n con jun cti on w it h s peci fic wor ds should be construed
consist ent ly wi th  the s pe cific wor ds  li sted  in  the d ef in it ion  of “r efuge e. ” Id . at 233.
Thus, the t erm “part icular social group” must be int erp r e t e d c on si st en t ly  wi th  the
o ther  ter ms . Id . Ra ce a nd  na tion ali ty ca nn ot b e ch an ged ; re ligion  a n d  p ol it ical
opin ions sh oul d n ot b e r equ ir ed t o be ch an ged. Thus , “social group” mus t be
interpr eted  to includ e only grou ps wh ich sh ar e “immu ta ble” chara cteris tics, as defined
by th e ot he r t er ms  of th e de fini tion .
iden t ica l to t he in ter na tion a l  law un der t he 1967 Un ited
Nat ions Protocol), a  cour t  sh ould  de ter min e t he r ea son s for  the
person’s flight from h er count ry. This is becaus e “displaced
persons”— “[t]hos e fleein g economic h ar dsh ip, a na rch y, war ,
persona l vend ett as  by govern men t officia ls, or a gen era lly
oppr ess ive and bru ta l governm ent ”—ar e us ua lly not consider ed
refugees  und er U.S. law.24 Without legislative guidance, th is
di fficult  an d fact-inten sive tas k ha s res ulted  in inconsisten t,
illogical,  and sometimes inhuma ne decisions by  the cour t s . The
following  case s i llu st ra te t he in consi st en cies of four  promin ent
defin it ions of “pa rt icula r s ocial group” developed in the feder al
circuit courts.
a. The “imm utable characteristic” test. In  Matt er of
Acosta ,2 5  t he BIA addressed whether Acosta was entitled to
asylum as  a  member  of a  pa r t icu la r socia l gr oup con si st in g of
Sa lvadoran  taxi drivers who part icipated in organized protests
again st t he governm ent . Acosta t estified tha t ,  a s  a  consequence
of the  protes t s,  he and  other  t axi drivers  r ece ived  dea th  th rea t s
and tha t  some of his fellow drivers had been killed. The BIA
concluded  th at  per secut ion of a pa rt icular  social grou p is
per secut ion th at  is
d ir ec t ed tow ar d a n  in div idu al  wh o is a  m em ber  of a g rou p  of
p e rs on s  all  of w h o m  s h a r e  a  c om m o n ,  i m m u t a b l e
ch a ra cter ist ic, i.e., a  cha ra cte ris tic t h at  eit h er  is b eyon d t h e
power  of t h e  i n d i vidu al m em ber s of th e gr oup  to ch an ge or  is
so fu n d a m e n t a l  t o t h e i r  id e n t it ies  or  consciences th at  i t  ough t
n o t  b e  r e qu i r e d  t o  b e  ch a n g e d . 26
Accordin g to the BIA, a  pa r t icu la r  socia l gr oup con si st s of
ind ividua ls who share truly immuta ble characteristics (such  as
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27. S ee GR AH L-MA D SE N , supra  not e 11 , at  217; see also GU Y S. GOODWIN -GILL ,
TH E  RE F U G E E  I N  INTERNATIONAL LAW  30– 31 (1 983 ).
28. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234.
29. S ee id . at 219.
30. OFFICE  O F  T H E U N I T E D  N A T I O N S  H I G H  CO M M’R FOR RE F U G E E S, H ANDBOOK ON
P ROCE D U RE S AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING RE F U G E E  ST A T U S  UN D E R  TH E  1951
CONVENTION  A N D T H E  1967 P ROTOCOL RE L AT I N G T O  TH E  ST AT U S  OF  RE F U G E E S 19 (1988)
[hereinafter  H ANDBOOK].
31. Fu l le r ton , supra  note 9, at  546–47.
32. 801 F. 2d  157 1 (9t h C ir . 19 86).
race an d n at iona lity), or cha ra cter ist ics th at  ar e “immu ta ble” in
the sense th at  an  ind ividu al s hou ld n ot be forced  to cha nge
them  (su ch as r eligion  and p olit ica l opin ion ).27
The BIA concluded tha t Acosta did not  m e et t he d efinit ion
of “par t icu la r  socia l g roup” because being a  t a x i dr ive r  is  not
imm u t able —a taxi d r ive r  can  change job s t o avoid  pe rse cut ion .
In  support of its ruling, the BIA noted that  “th e int ern at iona lly
accepted concept of refugee simply does not gua ra nt ee an
individual a  r igh t  to work  in  the  job  of h i s choice.”2 8  Because
Acost a  had  the power  to ch a nge h is  job, a  gr oup con si st in g of
politically  act ive tax i d r ivers  who had  rece ived  dea th  th rea t s
did  n ot  sh are a n  im mutable  character is t ic. Ther efor e, Acos ta
was not a member of a persecuted social group.
The BIA note d t ha t t he ca tegor y of “pa rt icular  socia l gr oup”
was more expa nsive th an  th e other  four  categories of ra ce,
reli gion , na t ionality an d political opinion combined ,29 and  tha t
“a  ‘part icular social group’ normally comprises persons of
sim ilar  backgroun d, ha bit s or s ocial st at us .”30 Desp ite t his
libera l l anguage,  some commenta tors  have  read  the BIA’s
in te rpre t a t ion  of “par t icu la r  socia l g roup” as  appl ied in  Acosta
as “nar r ow  a nd elitist” and  as evidence of a significant  Unit ed
Sta tes  bias.31 A possible basis for th is criticism is tha t th e BIA
did  not  in qu ir e in to the s ocia l s ign ifica nce of Acosta ’s a ctions  in
an  e ffor t  to unders tand  the soci a l im por tance of h is  condu ct  to
h im and  to othe r s  w it h in h is society an d did not r ecognize tha t
Acost a  really was powerless  to change h i s pas t  a s a  p rotes t ing
taxi -d r iver .
b. The “voluntary associational relationship” test. In
S anchez-Trujillo v. INS 32 the N in th  Cir cu it ’s in ter pr et a t ion  of
“par t icu la r social grou p” was d ra st ically di ffe ren t  from the
BIA’s. The  court  held  th at  a cla ss of youn g, ur ba n, w ork ing-
class  me n of milit ar y age  wh o had  main ta ined  pol it i ca l
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 2\ F I N A L \ T H O - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
806 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
33. Id . at  157 6 (em ph as is a dd ed ).
34. S ee id . How eve r,  in  199 0, t he  Ni nt h C ir cui t  contr adicte d itse lf by holding
tha t  family members of deserters are
by no mean s closely affiliated or discrete. While there m ay be s ome  comm on
impu lse or in te re st  th at , at  a h igh  leve l of gen er ali ty,  tie s t he  fam ilies  of
dese r t e r s tog et he r,  th e d iffer ences be twee n su ch fam ilies far ou tweigh  th e
simila rit ies . . . . “[i]ndividua ls falling wit hin  th e par am eter s of this s weepin g
dem ograp hic division na tur ally manifest  a pl ethora of different lifestyles,
va rying int ere sts , diver se cult ur es, a nd con tr ar y politica l lean ings.”
De Valle v. INS, 90 1 F.2d 78 7, 793 (9th  Cir. 1990) (quot ing Sa nchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2 d
a t  1576–77). This criteria was a pparen tly supposed to clear u p  t h e confusion, bu t it
appea r s t o  have on ly  exace rbated  it .
35. By developing it s own de finition, t he N int h Cir cuit fail ed t o give proper
defe re nce  to th e BIA’s immu ta bility r equ irem ent . S ee Fa t in  v. INS, 12 F .3d 1233,
1239 (3d Cir. 1990); Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F .2d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 1990 ); Ananeh-
F i r empong v. I NS , 76 6 F .2d  621 , 62 3–2 4 (1s t C ir . 19 85).
36. Sa nchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at  1577.
n e u tra li t y was n ot a pa rt icular social group an d, th erefore, did
not  qua lify for r efugee  st at us . Appa re nt ly disr ega rd ing t he
BIA’s  holding in  Acosta,  t h is  cour t  he ld  tha t
“p a r t icula r  social g rou p” imp lies a  collection  of people  closely
a ffi l ia t e d  wit h  ea ch ot h er , wh o ar e a ctu at ed  by s om e com m on
impu l se or in te re st . Of cen tr al  conce rn  is t h e ex ist en ce of a
volun tary  associat ional  rela tion ship  am ong  the  pu rpor t ed
mem bers , w h ich  im pa rt s som e com m on ch ar act er ist ic th at  is
fu n d a m e n t a l t o  the i r  i den t i ty  a s  a  mem ber  o f t ha t  d i scr e t e
socia l gr ou p. 33
Thus,  the Nin th Circu it will fin d “par ticu lar  social grou ps” only
if t hey ha ve b een  formed  or  en ter ed  in to volu n ta r ily . Th e cou r t
fu r ther  expla ine d t ha t t he  fam ily grou p wa s t he  pr ototyp ica l
exam ple of a  socia l gr oup. 34 However , th is exa mp le is logically
incons is tent  sin ce mem ber sh ip in a  fam ily gener a lly  is  not  a
voluntar y relationship.
The S anchez-Trujillo decision is a lso inconsis ten t wit h t he
BIA’s ear lier d ecision in Acosta.35 Firs t, th e cour t  improper ly
na rr owed the  immutab le  cha ract e r ist ic test. The San chez-
Tru jillo cour t  r ecognized  tha t  in  Acosta the BIA set  ou te r  limit s
to wha t a  social group  could consist  of. But  th e cour t  decided to
na r row the immu table char acteristic t e st  by requ i r ing  tha t
socia l g roups  be volunta ry in na tu re t o avoid “extend ing refugee
s ta tus to every alien displaced by genera l condit ions of un rest
or  violence in  his  or h er  hom e coun tr y.”36 This langu age is
cons is tent  with t he dist inction ma de between  refugees and
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37. S ee Pa rish , supra  note 7, at  941.
38. Refugee Act o f 198 0, P ub . L.  No.  96-2 12(a ), § 10 1(a ), 94  St at . 10 2 (19 80).
39. Fu l le r ton , supra  note 9, at  557.
40. S ee Ste inbock, supra not e 1, a t 7 90 (“L ike o ther  midcen tury  in te rna t iona l
law, these developments are a  direct response to World War II  and i t s immedia t e
prelude an d aft erm at h.”).
41. Fu l le r ton , supra  no te 9 , a t  558 (quot ing  DeValle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 793
(9th  Cir . 19 90)).
42. S ee supra note 34.
43. 947 F. 2d  660  (2d C ir . 19 91).
“displaced per sons .” However , th e court  ma y ha ve been  overly
concern ed about  th e potent ial size of certa in  social groups and,
th erefore, cou ld have m ist ak enly eq ua ted  th e re lat ively
re st r ict ive U.S. immigr at ion policies with a congressiona l inten t
t o narr owly define social groups.37 I n  r ea l it y , t h is  cour t ’s  r u li ng
seems to con t rad ict  Congress ’ s t a ted  purpose  to “respond to the
urgen t  ne eds of pe rson s s ub ject  t o pers ecut ion in t heir
homelands, . . . [and] to encourage all nations to provide
ass is tance and  r eset t l emen t  op p or tun i t ie s  to re fugees  to the
fulles t e xte nt  possib le.”38
Second, by requir ing a volunt ar y association as a n elemen t
ne cessa ry t o be conside re d a  “pa rt icula r s ocial grou p,” the  cour t
ignored  the fa ct  tha t  “[h]is tory shows  tha t  mem bers of
par t icu la r social groups h ave been per secuted d espite group
members’ la ck of in ter es t  in  ass ocia t ing with  each  other . The
Nazi per secu t ion  of non-religious  J ews t ota lly ass imila ted  int o
Ger ma n s ociety is on ly one vivid e xam ple.”39 In fact, the J ewish
per secut ion a t  the han ds of the  Nazi s was  a  major  mot iva t ing
force beh in d t he or igin a l in ter na t ion a l r efu gee laws.40 In  the
face of su ch  d r a m at ic a nd t ragic h is tory, it  se em s s t range for  a
circuit  cour t  to s t a te tha t  “major  .  . .  popu la t ion[s]  . . . will
ra re ly, if ever, const itu te a distinct  social gr oup.”41 It  is also
reve alin g th at  since S anchez-Trujillo,  t he Nin th  Circu it  has  not
been able  to apply i t s “volunta ry a s socia tiona l r e la t ionsh ip  t es t ”
in  a  cons is tent  manner (a  pe rsi st en t  pr oblem wit h  a ll of t he
tests). Specifically, the Ninth  Circuit has in later cases
con t r ad ict ed S anchez-Trujillo by holdin g that  family groups
usually do not constitute part icular social groups.42
c. The “distin guishin g characteristic” test. In  Gom ez v.
INS 43 t he  Second Cir cu i t  accepted  the  S anchez-Trujillo
definit ion of “part icular social groups” but included an
add it iona l requirement. The Second Cir cu i t  held tha t  “[a ]
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44. Id . at 664.
45. The cour t  u l t im a tely held tha t th e group to which Gomez belonged (women
who had been ra ped and beaten ) did not have an y dis cr e t e  ch a r acter istic wh ich could
distinguish her  from ot her  women . S ee Gom ez v. INS, 947 F .2d 660, 663-64 (2d Cir.
199 1).  This seems t o be a necessary, yet nar row, interpret ation in th is instan ce.
46. S ee Fu llert on, supra  no t e 9 , a t  562 . Fo r  an e xam ple  of a  German  cour t
decis ion,  see J udgmen t of March 29, 1985, No. 17 K 10.343/83, Ver wa lt un gsg er ich t
Gelsenkirchen  [Gels en kir che n Ad mi nis tr at ive C our t]. F or a n exa mple of a  Canadian
cour t  decision, see Astudillo v. Minister of Employment a nd  I m m ig r ation [1979] 31
Na t ’l Rep. 121. For discussion of these and oth er foreign court  decisions, see
Fu l le r ton , supra  not e 9, at  531–41 n n.166 –216 a nd a ccompan ying t ext. 
47. 25 F. 3d  636 , 64 0 (8t h C ir . 19 94).
par t icu la r social group is comprised of individuals who possess
some fundamen ta l cha ract e r is t ic i n common  which  serves  to
distinguish th em in  th e eyes of a pe rs ecut or—or in  t he eyes  of
the out side  wor ld  in  gen er a l. . . .  [T]h e at tr ibutes  of a  pa r t icu la r
socia l grou p m us t b e r ecogniza ble a nd  discr et e.”44 Th is  was the
first  time a U.S. court emphasized th a t  t h e perceptions of
othe r s a re  impor tan t  when  defin ing the  scope of a  socia l g roup45
and the reby pu t  the United  S ta te s m or e in lin e wit h t he
de cis ion s of foreign  cour t s. 46 Unfor tuna tely,  and  desp it e  it s
pr ogres sive holding, the Gom ez decisi on  fails to an swer
impor tan t  quest ions concern ing t he d efinit ion of “pa rt icular
social  gr oup.” Does  requir in g a  “recogn iza ble  character is t ic”
n a r r ow or expand t he other  definitions? Must  t h e
distingu ish ing cha ra cter ist ic be “imm ut able ” as  defined  in
Acosta? Is th e dist ingu ish able  cha ra cter ist ic volun ta ry or  can  i t
be im pos ed  by t he p er se cutors? The Gom ez decision declares a
necessa ry element of refugee law ana lysis and appl ica t ion .
However , by acceptin g the S anchez-Trujillo volunta ry
re la t ionsh ip tes t a nd  at  th e sa me t ime d efinin g social groups by
outside per ception s,  the Gom ez  tes t is  seem ingly u nwor ka ble
because  not  a ll (or  even m ost) cha ra cter ist ics per ceived by a n
outsider ar e volunta r il y chosen  bu t  i n st ead may be a rb it r a r il y
imposed by th e outsider . These tw o tests contr adict ea ch other .
d . Combinin g the “im m utable characteristic” and
“voluntary associational relationship” tests. As  a  fina l exam ple
of the  ci rcu i t  tu rmoi l,  in  Sa faie v. INS ,47 th e Eigh th  Circu it  held
tha t  both  the S anchez-Tru jillo “volun ta ry associa t iona l
relationship” test an d Acosta’s “im mut able char acteristic” test
were  re leva nt  in det er min in g t he exis ten ce of a  socia l gr oup.
Alth ough  broad and seemingly all-encompa ssing in it s scope,
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48. 144 F. 3d  505  (7t h C ir . 19 98).
49. S ee id. at 507.
50. S ee id .
51. S ee id. at 507–08.
th i s holding is also inter na lly contr adictory since i m m uta ble
cha ract e r is t ics a r e  not  necessar ily volunta ry as  requ ired by
S anchez-Trujillo. Like Gom ez ,  a t est  which  contr ad icts it self is
no t est  at  all.
C. Lwin v. INS
1. Th e facts
Lw in  v. INS 48 is  a  r ecen t  example  of a  ci r cu i t cou r t ’s
att empt  to define p ar ticu lar  social gr oups . Mya L win , a
Burmese ci t izen ,  was  the fa the r  of a  s tuden t  d is s iden t  who fled
Burma in  the wake of the  mil it a ry  jun ta ’s crackdown on  p ro-
democracy up ris ings  in 198 8. Desp ite order s from  th e police
tha t  he  repor t  any cont act with  his son, Mya m aint ained
unau t horized commu nications with him: first when his son
rea ched Th a ila nd,  and la ter  a ft er  h is  son  made  h is  wa y t o the
Unit ed States. 49 After his son’s escape, mili t a ry officia ls  twice
in te r rogated Mya  and  h is wife. The government  also
inter cepted a  le t t er  from Mya’s  son  to Mya’s wife, who was l at e r
in te r rogated abou t  t he l et t e r ’s  con ten t s.
Mya  eve ntua lly  vis it ed  h is  son  in  t h e United  S ta tes  and
app lied for political a sylu m and with holdin g of depor ta tion . His
ap plicat ion wa s base d on  h is  well-fou nde d fear  of pers ecu t ion
due to: (1) the p olitical opin ions of his son tha t th e Burmese
govern men t  would impute to him , an d (2) his m emb ers hip  in a
par t icu la r socia l gr oup, na mely, par ent s of Bur mese s tu dent
dissidents.50 At  t r ia l, Mya  subm itt ed evidence of Burm a’s
mist r e a tment of other  di ss iden t s ’ pa ren t s . A former  s tuden t
tes tified  tha t  t he  st uden t ’s  fa the r  had been  a r res ted and
sent enced to twe lve  yea rs in  pr ison  for  t ryin g t o con tact  the
s tuden t . Finally, Mya and his son  t e st i fi ed  abou t  othe r  pa ren t s
who had b een  ar res ted  and impr isoned  for  t ryin g t o contact
the ir  ch i ld ren .51
The Immigrat ion J udge (IJ) den ied  Mya ’s p et it ion  for
asylum and with holdin g of deport at ion, r ulin g th at  Mya  ha d
failed to estab li sh  tha t  he was persecu ted on  account  of any
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52. S ee i d .
53. S ee id . at 512.
54. S ee id .
55. S ee id . at 510.
56. Id . (qu oti ng  Ili ev v . IN S, 1 27 F .3d  638 , 64 2 n .3 (7 th  Cir . 19 97))  ( a lt e r a tions
in  or igin al ).
57. Id . at  511  (qu oti ng  Ma tt er  of Acost a,  19 I . & N . De c. 21 1, 2 33 (1 985 )).
58. Id . (citing Me guen ine v. I NS, 13 9 F.3d  25, 28 n .2 (1st Cir. 1998); Fa tin  v.
INS, 12 F.3 d 1233, 12 39–41 (3d Cir . 1993); Alvare z-Flore s v. INS, 909 F.2d  1, 7 (1st
impu ted  polit ica l opinion. Th e IJ  did n ot a ddr ess M ya’s social
gr oup claim.  Mya appealed the IJ ’s ruling, and th e BIA
affirmed  wit h  lit t le e xpla na t ion .52 On  ap pea l, the Seven th
Circu it  uph eld  the low er  cour t s’ ru lin g t ha t  Mya  had n ot
suffered per secut ion based on im put ed political opinion. But t he
cour t  a l so found  tha t , a l though  Mya  had p ressed h i s socia l
gr oup claim repeat edly before the IJ an d th e BIA, his
a rgumen t s were d is rega rde d a t  ea ch st ep  of t he  ad min ist ra tive
proceedings.53 The Seven th Cir cu i t  then  he ld  tha t  Mya  had
esta blished tha t  he was  a  member  of the  socia l g roup  of pa ren t s
of Burmese st uden t  diss iden t s,  and r em ande d t he ca se  for  an
examina t ion  of t he  ex ten t  t o wh ich  pa rents of d is s iden t
s tuden t s wer e exposed to persecution by the Burmese
govern men t. 54
2. The cour t’s  reason ing
 After  findin g th at  Mya ha d sufficiently ra ised h i s socia l
gr oup claim, 55 th e cour t a rt iculated t he following three-part
asylum test  previously adopted  in th e Sevent h  Cir cu it : “[a]n
alien  must  (1) id en t ify a  pa r t icu la r  socia l gr oup; (2) establish
tha t  [the  alien] is a m emb er of th at  group ; an d (3) esta blish
tha t  [the a lie n’s] w ell -founde d fea r  of pe r se cut ion  is  ba se d on
[the alie n’s] mem ber sh ip in  th at  grou p.”56 Not ing  the lack of
legisla tive  gu idance, t he cou r t  r ecognize d t ha t  the BIA h ad
delineat ed th e outer  limit of the social group definition by
req uir ing tha t  members of a  par ticular  social group sh ar e a
“comm on, immutable characte r is t ic” such  as  sex , r ace ,
eth nicity, or pa st exper ience.57
T h e Lwin  cour t  next  recognized  the s t rugg le  cour t s  have
had in  developin g a  wor ka ble  de fin it ion  of “p a r t icula r s ocial
group.” Th e F ir st  and T hir d C ir cu it s e ndor se  the BIA’s
“immutable character is t ic” defin it ion ,58 while th e Nin th  Ci rcu i t
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Cir . 199 0); An an eh -Fi re mp on g v. I NS , 76 6 F .2d  621 , 62 6 (1s t C ir . 19 85)).
59. I d . at 511–12  (citing Li v. INS , 92 F.3d 98 5, 987 (9th  Cir. 1996); De Valle
v. INS, 90 1 F.2d 78 7, 792–93 (9th  Cir. 1990); San chez-Tru jillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571,
1576 (9t h C ir . 19 86)).
60. S ee id . (cit in g Gom ez v . IN S, 9 47 F .2d  660 , 66 4 (2d  Cir . 19 91)).
61. Id . at  512 (quotin g Acosta, 19  I. &  N.  Dec. a t 2 33).
62. Id .
63. S ee id .
diverges an d const ru es “social gr oup” to req uir e a “volunt ar y
associa t iona l relationsh ip.”59 Mea nwh ile, th e Second Cir cuit
emph asizes  the  impor tance  of exte rna l p er ceptions.60 As a
resul t of th i s sp li t  among  the ci rcu i t s,  the Lw in  cour t  had  a t
lea st  th ree  di ffer en t  t es t s t o choose  from.
The Lw in  court  elected  to follow  t h e Acosta immutable
cha ract e r is t ic test  because it bes t “preserve[d ] the  concept  tha t
re fugee  s t a tus i s r e st r ict ed to ‘ind ividua ls wh o ar e eit her  un able
by their own actions, or as a mat ter of conscience should not  be
required, to a void per secu tion .’”61 The cour t  noted  tha t  the
Nin th Circu it ’s “voluntar y associational relationship” test
conflict ed with  Acosta’s immutabil it y r equ ir em en t . Th e cou r t
a lso rem ar ked  th at  while t he S econd Cir cuit  accur at ely
ar ticulat ed th e sign ificance of exter na l percept ion, it “offers
litt le gu idance in  the way of a  posit ive defin ition .”62 The cour t
concluded  that  parent s of Burmese student  dissidents sha re
common immutable characte r is t ics  and  do form a  pa r t icu la r
socia l group.63 Bu t  because  th is  wa s on ly on e of the elements of
the th ree-pa r t  t es t , t he cou r t  rem ande d t he ca se  so t he lower
cour t  could  det erm ine t he lik elihood t ha t m emb ers  of this
par t icu la r social gr oup w ould s uffer  per secu tion . Thu s, t he
Seven th Circu it r ecognized the  confus ion  among  the cour t s  and
adop ted t he Acosta definition, which it considered most
rea sonable.
III. ANALYSIS
 T h e “i m m u t a bl e ch a ract er ist ic” te st  esp ouse d by t he  BIA
and th e Seven th  Circu it in  Lw in  r e fl ect s  the humani ta r ian
purpose of r e fugee  la w: t o pr otect  pe ople s uffer in g fr om
per secut ion based on stat us, char acteristics, or  exp res sions of
belie f. Both  in t e rna t iona l  and domes t ic commenta tors  have
cons is t en t ly cont ended t ha t t he definition of “refugee,” which
includes  “pa r t icu lar  soci a l g roups ,” was int ended to be, a nd
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64. S ee Fu llert on, supra note 9, at  523.
65. Id .; see also Mau ree n Gr aves , From Definition to Exploration: Social Groups
and Polit ical Asylum E ligibil ity, 26 SAN  DIEGO L. RE V. 739 , 74 8 n .51  (198 9); Ar th ur
C. Helt on, Persecution on Account of Mem bership in a S ocial Group  as a  Ba sis  for
R efu gee Status , 15 CO L U M. H U M . RTS . L. RE V. 39,  40 n .9,  41 n .13  (198 3).
66. Fu l le r ton , supra  note 9, at  543.
67. S ee IN S v.  Ca rd oza -Fo ns eca , 48 0 U .S.  421 , 42 8 (19 87).
shou ld be, in te rp re te d br oadly. 64 “They note t ha t t he pu rposes
under lying th e Refugee Act of 1980 [as well  as th e  under ly ing
in terna t iona l legisla tion ] were  gene rou s: to exp an d t he
recogn it ion  of re fugees an d to sta nda rdize th e refugee
processing pr ocedur es.”65 These pu rposes  s t and  in  s t a rk
contr ast  to the t en de ncy of U .S. cou r t s t o adopt rest r i ct ive  and
incons is tent  defin ition s of “social gr oup.”66  The pers is t ent
chasm between  progressive U.S. an d int ern at ional refugee
policies an d th e misa pplication an d inconsisten t i n te rpr eta tion
of thes e p olicies  by U .S. cou r t s on  a case-by-case basis demands
a  closer look at t he purposes and goals of refugee law.67 It  is
possible tha t  the cir cu it s h ave n ot  yet  caugh t  the s pi r it  of
refugee law.
Alth ough  in  ha rmony  wi th  the humani ta r ian  goa l s of
re fugee  law , Lw in ’s “imm ut able char acter ist ic” t e st  fa i ls  t o
provide a  consist ent  mea ns  of defining “par ticu lar  social
groups.” This problem ar ises when  a cour t’s vision is  blurr ed by
its  own  pe rcep t ion s of t he s ign ifica nce of t h e  a lien ’s b eh avior .
These de cis ion s are usu ally made  wit h  lit t le h elp fu l explana t ion
and,  as ment ioned a bove, can r eflect a  judicia l te nd en cy to
nar r ow t h e scope of refugee law by imposing the court s’
sometim es biased judgments of t h e  alien ’s beh avior. Th is
re st r ict ive tendency is most apparen t  when  a  court  must  decide
when  volun tary  act ions give rise to char acteristics wh ich  a
person should n ot be expected to change in ord er t o avoid
persecu t ion .
In  order  to deter mine wh en volunt ar y condu ct is sufficient
to est ablis h m emb ers hip  in a  per secut ed pa rt icular  social
group, cour t s , such  as  the cour t  in  Lw in ,  need to make  a  factua l
inquir y into th e social environm ent  of th e alien’s coun t ry which
can  reve a l t he n ega t ive  pe rcep t ion s a nd s ocia l s t igm a of th e
alien ’s act ion s a nd b eh avior . Without  an  object ive , fa ctua l
inqu iry (which could include eyewit ness  or  fi r st -hand
tes t imony , news  repor t s , or  s t a tem ents of governmenta l
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777 F.2d  509, 514 n .3 (9th  Cir. 19 85); Mat ter  of Acosta , 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 221
(198 5).
71. S ee GR AH L-MA D SE N , supra  note 11.
72. S ee id. at 217.
in ves t iga t ion s),  cour t s  migh t  adop t  a rbit r a ry defin it ion s of
par t icu la r social groups which  would exclude m an y aliens
dese rving th e protection an d secu r ity ava ilable in th e Unit ed
Stat es. The  following sect ions look at t he purposes of
in te rna t iona l refugee law and how curr ent United Sta tes case
law reflects th ose purposes.
A. Lwin  and the Hum anitarian Purposes of International
R efu gee L aw
1. International comm entary on international refugee law
 In  1979, th e Office of t h e U n it ed  Na t ion s  H i gh
Commissioner  for Refugees published a H andbook  on
Procedures  an d  Crit eria f or Determ in ing Refugee S ta tus
(Ha ndbook) in hopes of aiding cour ts’ efforts t o define th e ter m
“refugee.”68 The Handbook  s t a t es  t ha t  “‘[a ] pa r t icu la r  socia l
group’ normally comprises persons of similar background,
hab it s or  soci a l s t a tus. A fea r  of persecu t ion  cla im under  th i s
heading ma y frequ ent ly overlap  with  a fea r of per secut ion claim
on other  gr ounds , i.e . r ace, r eli gion  or  n a t ionalit y.”69 Thus,  the
United  Nat ions ha s deter mined  th at  one can be per secuted
because  of bot h  im mutable  char a ct er i st i cs  (background  and
social  st a tus) a nd ch aracter is t ics  wh ich  one s hould  not  be
forced to chan ge (habits). This language is meaningful because
cour t s in  the U nit ed  St a tes  conside r  the H andb ook t o be “a
sign ificant  sour ce of guid an ce.”70
An ot her  significan t s our ce of guida nce is a  work  by Atle
Gra h l -M a dsen, the a u thor  of an  ea r ly a nd a u thor it a t ive  two-
volume  tr eat ise on in t erna tional refugee law.71 Gra hl-Madsen
wr ote t ha t t he  five refugee categories  can be separ at ed into two
genera l categories: those wh o are p er se cuted  for  rea son s b eyon d
th eir  contr ol and th ose who are persecuted for r easons over
wh ich  they h ave cont rol.72 He  note s t ha t  “‘socia l gr oup’ is of
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73. Id . at 21 9. The a ut hor goes  on to a rgu e th at  group s su ch as  nobility,
capitalists, landowners, busin essmen, farm ers, mem bers of linguistic or other
minorities, and even members of certain clubs or associations sh ould all cons tit ut e
par t i cu la r social groups. S ee id. at 219–20.
74. S ee id . at 220.
75. J A M E S C. H ATHAW AY, TH E  LA W  OF  RE F U G E E  ST A TU S  (199 1).
76. S ee id . at  164– 68; see also Fu llert on, supra  note 9, at  520.
77. S ee Ste inbock, supra  note 1, at  784, 795.
78. UNIVE RSAL  DE C L AR AT I ON  O F  H U M A N  RIGHTS , ar t.  19,  U. N.  Doc. A/8 10 (1 968 ).
broader  applicat ion tha n t he combined not ion s of racia l, e thn ic,
and reli giou s groups .”73 Accordin gly the Convent ion included
“social group ” in ord er t o fill possible  gaps in r efugee law.
Und er  th is in ter pr eta tion , th e pu rp ose of addin g “pa rt icular
socia l grou p” was  to cover a ny u nexp ect ed or new types of
persecu t ion , based on  both  volunta ry and involunta ry
characteristics. It  was  mea nt  to be flexible a nd  libera lly
interpreted.74
More recen t ly , James  Hathaway , the  Canad ian  schola r
res pons ible for  the important  work entitled The Law of R efu gee
Statu s, i nt e rpret e d th e definition of social groups in  refugee
law.75 Ha thaway re ject s  Grahl-Mads en ’s in ter pr et a t ion  as
over br oad and  ar gues th at  “par ticular social group” was  m e an t
t o encompass  groups defined by inn at e, una l t erable
characteristics; group s defin ed by t heir  pas t , s ince  h is tory
cannot  be changed; groups d efined by their  volit ion a l a ct s which
a re fundamenta l to th eir hu ma n dignit y; and groups  defined by
th eir  volunta ry associa t ion s,  the r equir ed  changin g of wh ich
would  force  renouncing bas ic  hum an r ights . 7 6  T h is
int erp ret at ion seems to echo the immu table char acteristic test
ap plied in  Lw in .
By incorpora t ing basic human r igh t s  in to the  de fin it ion  of
refugee, the  dra fte r s  of the cur ren t  de fin it ion  effectively decided
to es tabli sh  cer ta in  ba sic human r igh t s a s p r ivi leged  so t ha t
viola t ion  of th ese privileged rights  wou l d con s t it u t e
persecu t ion .77 Art icle  19 of t he Un ive rsa l De cla ra t ion  of Human
Right s s t at e s tha t  “[e]ver yon e h as t he r igh t  to freedom  of
opin ion  an d expr ession ; th is r ight  includ es fre edom t o hold
opin ion s with out  int erfer ence a nd  to seek , receive a nd  imp ar t
in forma t ion  and  ideas  th rough  any  media  a n d regardless of
front ier s.”78 This  bold st at em en t im plies  th at  holdin g opin ion s
is p rotected  under  both  h u m a n  r igh t s  law and re fugee  law and
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tha t  th e expr e s si on  of these opinions and ideas should also be
protected. When  an  a li en  seeks asylum  from persecut ion based
on th e alien ’s volun ta ry a cts, cour ts  mu st  inqu ire  whether  the
alien  is expressin g, thr ough condu ct, opinions pr otected by
human rights. Thus,  it is  eas y to see t ha t t he “par ticu lar  social
group” and  “pol it i ca l opinion” categories over la p.  Th e d ra ft er s of
the refu gee law s m ean t t o single ou t  ce r t a in  human  r ight s
viola t ion s an d elevate t hem  to a pr otected sta tu s un der r efugee
law. A human r igh t s  in te rpre ta t ion  of “re fugee” st rongly favor s
a  t e st  r equ i ring cour t s  t o ex a m in e the  a li en’s  mot ives  and  the
per secu tor ’s percep t ion s in  orde r  to de ter min e if p er se cut ion
has occu r red  or  is  lik ely  to occur .
2. The Lwin  “imm utable characteristic” test reflects the
hum anitarian purposes of refugee law
 Lw in ’s immu ta ble cha ra cter is t i c t e st  ca n  e n com p a ss
volun ta ry actions a nd beh avior. What  guidan ce ther e is seems
to supp ort t he Lw in  cour t ’s  eva lua t ion  tha t
t h e com m on  ch a r a ct e ris t ic t h a t  de fin e s t h e  gr ou p  “m u s t  be  on e
t h a t  t he  m ember s  o f th e gr ou p e ith er  can n ot  cha ng e, or s hou ld
n ot  be  requ i red  to  chan ge  becau se it  is fun da m en ta l to t he ir
i n d i vi d u a l iden t i t i e s  o r  consc iences .” .  . .  Th i s  p re se rves  the
concep t  t ha t  r e fugee  s t a t us  i s  r e s t r i c t ed  to  “ind iv idua l s  who
a r e  eit h e r  u n ab le b y t h eir  own  act ion s, or  as  a m at te r of
cons cien ce sh ou ld n ot b e r equ ire d, t o av oid p er se cut ion .”79
This  definition can include volu n ta ry r ela t ion sh ips or  behavior s
which  an individual can change but should n ot  be r equ i red to
change wh en  viewed, not only through the lens of a
westernized, ind us tr ialize d,  democra t i c cu l tu re,  bu t  th rough
the lens of the s ocia l a nd p olit ica l a tmosp her e of t he cou nt ry
where th e a l ie n  reside s. In  th is r egar d, t he im mu ta ble
cha ract e r is t ic t es t  is  en t ir ely  consi st en t  wit h  in ter na t ion a l
hum an rights policies.
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80. Fu l le r ton , supra  note 9, at  516–17.
81. Ste inbock, supra  not e 1, a t 8 02; see also Note , Pol it ical Legitimacy in the
Law  of Political Asylum , 99 HARV. L. RE V. 450 , 46 5–6 6 (19 85).
3. Although harm onious with refugee law goals, the
im m uta ble char act eri st ic t est  fa il s t o pr ovi de a con si st en t
m eans of determining wh en voluntary conduct is an
ext ension  of a  per son ’s identi ty  or con science
 a. Volunt ary con d u ct as a basis for m embership in  a
particular social group. Prob lems of inter pret at ion arise wh en
a  cour t  mus t  decide  whe ther  volunta ry con d u ct  is  condu ct  tha t
a  person  shou ld not be r equir ed t o chan ge in or der  to a void
persecu t ion . Volun ta ry behav ior  and  characte r is t ics  a re not
immutable in t he s ens e th at  th ey ar e un alt era ble; th ere fore, it
is di fficu lt , if n ot  im pos sible, for a  cour t t o definitively label
ce r ta in  behavior  a s  fundamen tal to ind ividu al id en tit y,
conscience, hu m an  d ign ity , or  basic human r igh t s . The
immutable character is t ic t es t  a lon e does not  he lp  to res olve th is
issue because
pe rs ecu tion  for  r ea sons  beyond  one ’s  con t r o l i s  obvious ly
o ffens ive . Th e con ver se , h owe ver , is n ot  t r u e . P u n is h in g
ind ividu als  fo r a t t r ibu t e s  o r  a ct i on s  w i t h i n  t h e i r  co n t r o l d o e s
n ot  n eces sa ril y in volve  pu n ish m en t of b la m e-w ort h y be h av ior.
[T h e “im m u t ab le  cha ra c t e r i s t i c” t e s t  does ]  no t  d i s t ingu i sh
when  p u n i sh m e n t  fo r v ol u n t a r y a c t s i n vo lv e s b la m e w o r t h y
beh av ior fr om  wh en  it d oes  n ot. 80
It  is difficult for cour ts  to differen tia te b etw een  volunt ar y
beh avior  wh ich  wou ld  give  r ise t o a  “pa r t icu la r  social  group”
class ifica t ion  and  volu nta ry be havior  wh ich  wou ld  not ; the
cla ss ifica t ion  “involves profound  normat ive  judgments  abou t
such  elements a s the legitimacy of the allegedly persecu t ing
govern men t’s policies, the asylum seeker’s response to those
policies, th e necessit y of th at  res pons e, an d t he p ropor tion alit y
between  th e re spon se a nd  th e pr act ice at  which  it is  dir ected .”81
T h e myr ia d of ju dicia l in ter pr et a t ion s of t he d efin it ion  of
“refugee” a re a  t es t im ony t o the in her en t  di fficu lt y of r e moving
onese lf from one’s own world view a nd  un der st an din g th e
per cept ions and  a t t itudes  of the  pe rsecu tors  and  the
pers ecut ees. Beca use  of th is  di fficu lt y, when  the exis t en ce of a
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pa rt icular  social grou p is a lleged, it  is i nadequa te to rely  on the
old adage th at  judges will know th em wh en t hey see t hem .82
b. Courts’ in consistent applications of the imm utable
characteristic tes t t o vol un ta ry  beh av ior . As requests for
asylum and  wi thholding of depor ta t i on  have increased , the
number  of alien s wh o seek t his  relief as mem bers of persecut ed
social grou ps h as  als o incre as ed. Th e a dva nt age s of app lying a
test  which  defines  social grou ps by “imm ut able ” cha ra cter ist ics
has been  discu sse d a bove. Despite t he  soundness  of t he  t es t ,
however, th e following cases illust ra te t he n eed to broaden  th e
t e st ’s cr i t er i a  by  t aking in to account  the  socia l con text  of the
a l ien’s coun tr y, especia lly when  th e pa rt icular  social grou p is
based on  volunta ry conduct .
Fatin  v. INS  is one exa mp le of when  the  immutab le
cha ract e r is t ic test worked.83 In  Fatin ,  an  I ran ian  woman
ar gued th at  she w a s  a  m ember of a group of the “upper class of
I ran ian  women wh o support ed th e Shah  of Iran, a group of
e d u c a t e d , Wes te r n ized ,  f ree-t h i n k ing in dividu als .”8 4
Specifically, Fa tin  disa gree d wit h  the  r equ ir emen t  of wea rin g a
veil. The Third Circuit adopted the immutable characteristic
t es t  and h eld  tha t  the s ocia l gr oup
iden t i f i ed by th e pet i t ioner  m ay we l l  sat isfy th e  BIA’s
de fini tion  o f t h a t  c on c ep t , fo r  if a  w o m a n ’s  op p os it i on  t o  t he
I r a n i a n l aws  in  ques t ion  i s  so  p ro found  th a t  sh e  wou ld  choose
t o su f fe r t h e  s ev er e  con se qu en ces  of n on com pl ia n ce, h er  be lie fs
m a y  well  be  cha rac t e r i zed  a s  “s o fu n d a m e n t a l  t o [h e r ] i d en t i t y
or  cons cien ce t h at  [th ey] ou gh t n ot b e  r equ i red  t o  be
cha n ged .”85
Ins tead of finding tha t  Fa t in  was b r ing ing  the persecution upon
her self th rough h er a ctions, the cour t  a t t empted  to unders tand
Fa t in ’s mot ives a nd t he s ocia l a nd s ociet a l con se qu en ces  of
Fa t in ’s  conduct .
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86. 87 F. 3d  932  (7t h C ir . 19 96).
87. Id . at 936.
88. Id . at 935.
89. 980 F. 2d  112 9 (7t h C ir . 19 92).
90. S ee id . at  1130 . An a me nd me nt  wh ich ca me  int o effect  aft er  Ba st an ipou r
applied for asylum  forbids the gr ant  of asylum t o an alien who ha s committed  a n
aggravat ed felony. S ee 8 U .S. C. § 1 158 (b) (19 94).
In  Sh arif v. INS 86 th e cour t considered wh eth er a  pa r t icu la r
socia l gr ou p  ca n  ar ise t hr ough  th e violat ion of a coun tr y’s
gener ally applicable laws. Sharif ’s ar gum ent  was  esse nt ially
the sa me a rgu men t m ad e in  Fatin—that  sh e fea red  pe rse cut ion
on account  of bein g a  “wes ter n ized w oman.” Th e cou r t  denied
Shar if’s re qu est  for as ylum  becau se “even a ssu min g th at
‘wester nized women ’ as  defined  by Sh ar if ar e a cogniza ble socia l
group—a proposition th at  is debat able at  bes t —S h arif is st ill
un able  to demons t ra te a  reasonab le fear  of pers ecut ion.”87
Alth ough  the  cour t  di d n ot  at tem pt  to a ffirma tively d efine
“par t icu la r social gr oup,” it d id  st a te t ha t  pu nishmen t  for
conduct  which  violat es a  count ry’s la ws of gener al a pplica bility
does not  amount  to persecu t ion  (and  thus  does  not  give r i se  t o a
socia l group) “absent  some s howin g th at  th e pu nis hm ent  is
bein g adm inister ed for  a  nefa r iou s pu rp ose.”88 The court lim ited
the scope of social groups t ha t violate a coun t ry ’s  laws  by
focusing on  the t ype of pu nis hm ent . This  back  door  approach  to
defin ing “par ticular social group” shows the  cour t ’s hesi t ancy  to
cons t ruct  a concrete definition; but it  also demonstrates at  least
a  ten ta t ive  wil lin gn es s t o look a t  t he  prob lem from both
Shar if’s an d Ira n’s points of view.
In  Bastanip our v. INS 89 t he  cour t  cons idered the  socia l
conte xt  of Ba st an ipour ’s cr im ina l  and re ligious  act s  and
concret ely held  tha t  pu nishmen t  for  nonpol it ica l cr im ina l
conduct  does not give rise to a persecuta ble social group.
Bastan ipour  was convicted  of a felony dru g char ge wh ile
res id ing in the U.S. After Bastanipour se rved nine years of a
fift een  year  sen ten ce, th e IN S in itia ted  depor ta tion
proceedings.90 Bast an ipour a rgued  th at  he fear ed pers ecut ion
by th e Ira nian  govern m e n t upon  depor ta t ion  because d rug
tr afficking “in pr esen t -day Ira n is pu nish able by deat h
frequ ent ly admin i st e red  a ft e r  summary pr oceedings t ha t wou ld
be regarded in this count ry as a tr avesty of due process of
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law .”91 Th e cou r t  held  tha t  “dr ug t ra ffick er s a re n ot  the s or t  of
‘par t icu la r social grou p’ to wh ich t he p rovision on  as ylum
re fers .”92 The court continued,
[w]ha t eve r  its  pr ecis e s cope , th e t er m  “par ticu lar  social
g roups” su re ly wa s n ot in te n de d for  th e p rot ect ion  o f mem bers
of th e cr im in al  clas s in  th is cou n tr y, m er ely u pon  a  sh ow in g
t h a t  a  foreign  coun t ry  dea l s  w i th  them  even  m o r e h a r s h ly  t h a n
w e do. A  con t r a r y  con cl u si on  w ou l d col la p s e t h e  fu n d a m e n t a l
dis tin ction  be t w ee n  p e r s ec u t io n  on  t h e  o n e  h a n d  a n d  t h e
p rosecu t ion  o f nonpo l i t i ca l  c r imes  on  the  o the r .93
Bastan ipour  also argued t h a t  h e wou ld  be  pu t  to de a th  for
becoming  a Chr istian  while in p r i son .  The  cour t  he ld  tha t
Musl ims who ren ounce I s la m  and convert to Christianity do
const it u te a  socia l gr oup b eca use  under  I ran ian  l aw ap osta sy is
punisha ble by death . Thus, t he court  distin guished  between
pol it ica l and  nonpolitical condu ct. On  th e one h an d, t his  ru le
refle ct s th e privileged protection refugee law offers t he ba sic
human r igh t  of re ligious  expression .  On  the other ha nd, it gives
litt le gu idance a s  t o w h at t ypes  of nonpolit ical crim es, if a ny a t
all,  are persecutable by a government. As this  cou r t  seems  to
imp ly, th e ha rsh ness  of th e pun ishm ent  m a y  prov ide insigh t
in to the  “t rue” goa l s and m otives of the pun ishm ent . In other
words, cr im es  may be come polit ica l by  the s eve r it y of the
pena lties a t t ached.  If,  in  fact ,  those  who com m i t  nonpol it ica l
crimes  a re  never  a fforded r e fugee p rotect ion , perhaps cour t s
shou ld ma ke objective, fact ua l evalu at ions of whet her  th e crim e
is political in n at ur e in th e cont ext of the alien’s coun tr y. The
pol it ica l/n onpol it ica l dist inct ion may pr ovid e va lu able  gu idance
in in te rp re tin g th e defin ition  of “pa rt icula r s ocial grou p.”
T h e fundam ental  weakness  of t he “immut able
cha ract e r is t ic” tes t wa s illus tr at ed in  Alv ar ez-F lores v. INS 94
when  th e court  failed t o cons ider  th e social r am i fica t ion s of
chees em ak ing.  In  th is cas e, Alvar ez-Flores  as ser ted  his
membership in a gr oup of campesin o cheesem ak e r s who feared
re t a li a tion  by the m ilitar y governm ent  for h aving su ccum bed to
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95. He a r g u ed  t h a t  ch e es e m ak e r s are especially susceptible to guerrillas’
demands  becau se t he h ar d chee se is r esist an t t o spoilage . See id.  at 7.
96. Id .
97. Id .
98. S ee supra  no t e 7  and accompany ing  t ex t .
99. S ee St evic v. Sava , 678 F .2d 401, 40 6 (2d Cir . 1982), rev’d. on  oth er grou nd s
sub n om . IN S v. S te vic, 46 7 U .S. 4 07 (19 84) (st at ing  th at  cour t s  m u s t  eva lua t e t he
“condit ions  in  th e cou nt ry  of or igin , it s la ws , a nd  th e e xpe ri en ces  of ot he rs ”).
guerrillas’ demands for cheese. 95 The  court  den ied t his
a r gument “[s]ince it  is considered that  cheesemaking is not an
immutable cha ract e r ist ic which  cannot  be changed  by  the
campesinos, or wh ich t he y sh ould n ot be r equ ire d t o chan ge.”96
Alvar ez-Flores  a lso a rgued tha t  he was  not  me re ly a
cheesema ker , bu t  a  cheesemaker  who had already  su pp lie d food
to th e guerr illas, a pa st cha ra cterist ic beyond his power to
change. The court refused to endorse s u ch  a “stra ined”
int erp ret at ion of Acosta.97 Ult imately , h owever , t he cou r t ’s
den ia l res ted  on Alvar ez-Flor es’ lack  of evidence p rovin g th at
cheesema ker s had been  su bject  to pe r se cut ion  and h is  la ck of
credibility.  Fu rt her more, th e cour t a ppear s to dismiss  th e idea
t h a t  v ol u n t a r y con d u ct  ca n  becom e  a n  “i m m u t a ble
cha ract e r is t ic” with  th e pa ssa ge of time, even  th ough it  is
obvious tha t  a pa st a ction or sta tu s cann ot be changed  and  may
become t he basi s for  pe r se cut ion .
The above cases illustr a t e the  cour t s ’ r e luctance  to conduct
a  factua l in qu ir y in to the socia l s ign ificance of an alien’s past
and pr esen t condu ct. Th is is  th e fundamenta l  fl aw of the
immutable cha ract erist ic test  as  ap plied in  Lw in . Without  a
test  which  a llows for  in qu ir y in to the socia l s ign ifica nce of a
person’s actions, th e Lw in  t es t  wil l n eve r  fu lly  em br ace or
promote th e tru e pur poses of refugee law.
B. Social Context Defines “Particular Social Groups”
 E ven  th ough th e L win  cou r t  cor r e ct l y a d op t ed t he
immutable cha ract e r is t ic t e st  from Acosta, th e te st  only
ident ified the “outer  lim it s” of t he r efu gee  de fin it ion .98 In order
to det erm ine w ha t t ypes of volunt ar y cond uct  est ablis h t he
exi st en ce of a  pa rt i cu l ar  social group, cour ts m ust  consider  th e
socia l environment  and th e perceptions  of those livin g in t he
person’s coun t ry.99 A more concret e and w orkable  in ter pr et a t ion
of th is  t es t  must in clude th e classificat ion of groups “based
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100. Pa r i sh , supra  not e 7, at  944–45 (citin g J ohn  Boswell, Jews, Bicycle Riders,
and Gay People, 1 YALE J.L.  & H UM AN . 205, 219–20, 226–27 (1989)); see generally
John C. Tur ner , T owa rd s a C ogn iti ve R edef in iti on of  th e S ocial  Group, in  SOCIAL
IDENTITY  AND IN T E R GR O U P  RE L A TI O N S 11 (H en ri  Ta jfel  ed ., 1 982 ) (ar gu ing  tha t  t he
per cept ion  of “comm on ca tegor y m em ber sh ip” is m ore  im por ta nt  to for ma tion  of
funct iona l soci al  cla ss ifica ti on  th an  sim ila ri ty  am on g m em ber s).
101. Pa r i sh , supra  note 7, at  946–47.
upon a  socia lly  mea nin gfu l d is t in ct ion —on common  iden t ity
ra th er  th an  me re  sim ilar ity. .  . . [A] mer ely descr ipt ive labe l is
insuffi cien t  to define a socia l gr oup; t he label m us t r eflect social
rea lity  in t he  re fugee’s coun tr y of origin .”100 Any dist inct ion
used  to ident ify s ocia l gr oups  must  be  made  on a  case -by-ca se
basis, t ak ing  in to account  the  conduct ’s  pol it i ca l  and socia l
resona nce. “By focus ing on s ocial resonan ce, it allows
d et e r m ina t ion  of socia l g roup  s ta tus to be based upon  a  factua l
inqu i ry in to wha t  a  pa r t i cu la r class ification conn otes in  a  given
cu l tu re . Inqu iry int o the congn izability of a pu rp ort ed social
grou p is t hu s pla ced u pon a n object ive foun da tion .”101
Our own perceptions, a s well as h ow we a r e perceived by
othe r s, identify us within our society. Refugee law is ba sed on
dete rmin ing the motivations unde r lying per se cut ion . Some
per secut able  cha ract e r is t ics  a r e inna te or  immutab le  in  tha t  we
cannot  a lt e r  t hem because of our birt h or our p ast . Often th ey
a re easily id en t ifia ble  by p hys ica l ch aracter is t ics , m anner  of
dr ess, or  spee ch pa tt ern s, wh ile other ident ifiable tr aits  ar e th e
resul t of volu n ta ry be havior , con du ct , or  exp res sion of bel ief.
Bot h  of thes e typ es of tr ait s  often  become t he basi s for
persecu t ion . From all points of view, these tra its ar e  irr eleva nt
and ina dequa te r easons t o just ify ha rm ing an other . However,
in  a per secutor’s eyes, thes e trai ts  se rve t o iden t ify gr oups  of
ind ividua ls mar ked for  mis t rea tmen t . Be cause  of the im por tan t
role per ception  pla ys in a ny s ociety, L w in  is par tially flawed
because  its  immutab le  cha ract e r is t ic t e st  does n ot explicitly ca ll
for  an  examinat ion of exter na l social per ception s. Th is
examination is essential because
[i]f forces  in  a  socie ty  mis t aken ly  be li eve  tha t  a  g roup  ex is t s ,
a n d  a c t  on  t h at  beli e f , an y  persecu t ion  th a t  fo l lows  would  be
deemed  pe r secu t ion  based  on  m ember sh ip  in  a  so cia l  gr o u p .
Sim ilar ly ,  i f forces  in  socie ty  co r rec t ly  be li eve  tha t  a  g r ou p
ex i s t s , b u t  i n co r r ec t ly  a t t r ib u t e  d a n g er s  a n d  t h r e a t s  t o  t he
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102. Fu l le r ton , supra  note 9, at  541.
103. S ee, e.g., Alvarez-Flores v. INS , 909 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990)
104. Acosta it se lf, t he  or igin at or  of t h e “immutable charac te r is t ic” t e s t , i s t he
p r im e example of a court requiring an alien to change jobs.
g r o u p , a n y re su ltin g p er se cut ion  wou ld con st itu te  pe rs ecu tion
d u e  t o  m e m b e r s h i p  i n  a  s oc ia l  g r ou p .102
A Unit ed S ta t es  cour t  is necessar ily limited t o its own
perce pt ions or  comprehens ion  of wha t  socia l g roups  ex is t  and
whet her  thes e s ocia l gr oups  su ffer  pe r se cut ion . As discu ssed
above, some cour ts  th at  accept  th e imm ut able  cha ra cter ist ic
test  r e fuse to accept  tha t  pas t  act s  can  becom e imm ut able  in
the eye s of a  pe r se cutor .103 Oth er cour ts  ha ve su mm ar ily
deter mined  th at  cert ain  occup at ions  a re not  sign ificant  enou gh
and have he ld  tha t  an  alie n m us t ch an ge jobs in ord er t o avoid
persecu t ion .104 Th es e h old in gs  a re oft en  ta in ted  by t he n ormal
bias es t hat r esult from living in the Un ited States. While these
biases  and prejudices are, to some extent, unavoidable,  they
must  not form  th e basis for case law wh ich  ignores  the  socia l
environm ent  and at tit ud es of other  count ries  an d wh ich
disregar ds th e express an d implicit pu rposes of refugee law.
An examin at ion of th e “social res ona nce” of an  ind ividua l’s
conduct , her i t a ge, or beliefs will provide a more st able an d
cons is tent  basis for courts t o de cide ques t ion s of s ocia l gr oup
stat us. Th e socia l s ign ifica nce of cert ain beh avior can be
deter mined  by an  objective ga th er i n g a nd  ana lysi s of fact s
r el a t in g to the p reva iling socia l a nd p olit ica l con di t ion s a nd
a t t i tudes of the cou nt r ies  and t heir  cit izens.  Th ose  app lying for
re fugee  p rotect ion  shou ld  be  a llowed to present , among oth er
things, jou r nalistic accounts, expert opinions, and th ird party
repor t s and  s ta tements  in  ord er  to estab li sh  the  factua l
background of their social group claims.
IV. CO N C L U S I O N
 Whenever  refu gee la w fails, a  per son’s life th at  sh ould have
been pr otect ed  is  th rea ten ed . A si mple a dd it ion  to the
immutable cha ract e r is t ic t e st  a s  set  ou t  in  Lwin  v. INS  is
needed  to correct its deficiency. Particular social groups m u st
be defined by imm ut able  cha ra cter ist ics which  ha ve social
sign ifica nce in  the s ociet y a nd cu l t ur e  of the p er son ’s h ome
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coun t ry. The social significan ce of cert ain beh avior can be
deter mined  by an  objective, factu al in quir y int o th e social,
econ omic, and  pol it i ca l  a tmospher e of th e alien’s count ry. By
us ing a social  sign ifica nce t es t , cou r t s w ill  begin  to look  pa st
th eir  own  cu l tu ra l b ia ses  and to under s ta n d  h ow a  person’s
vol u n t a ry act ions a nd  conduct  ar e viewed t hr ough t he cu ltu ra l
and socia l bi ase s of t he h ome cou nt r ies. When  this happens,
U.S. cour ts will finally embr ace  the humani ta r ian  goa l s of
re fugee  law by accura tely an d consist ent ly iden tifying
part icular social groups.
John H ans Thom as
